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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

CaseNo.20050412-CA

GREGORY SHANE WAREHAM
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE ANY ERROR IN THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY
INSTRUCTION AND THE INSTRUCTION VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
The State in its Brief ofAppellee attempts to argue that Appellant invited any error in the
reasonable doubt jury instruction and that such instruction did not violate the Appellant's due
process rights. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 16-22.
A.

Appellant did not invite any error by asking the trial court to include the
term "obviate" in the instruction.

In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel asked that

the word "obviate" be inserted in the jury instructions1. Brief of the Appellee at p. 17. The
State's argument fails in that they have failed to cite any authority indicating that invited error
pertains to unsettled areas of law.

Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not

specifically addressed the issue of invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, sister
jurisdictions and federal courts provide guidance as to the issue. See, State v. Rothlisberger.
2004 UT App 226, f 14, 95 P.3d 1193 ("In circumstances in which Utah courts have not
definitively addressed an issue, it is appropriate for us to turn to decisions and commentators that
interpret related federal rules for guidance."), cert granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004).
Although not controlling, our sister jurisdiction in Colorado provides helpful insight in a
recent case, stating that "...where an error or omission in jury instructions is attributable to
inadvertence or attorney incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review
for plain error rather than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error."
People v. Hodges, 2005 WL 1645760 f 25 (Colo.App.,2005). While it is clear that the doctrine
of invited error should not apply, as the Colorado Court of Appeals indicated, the "plain error"
doctrine applied by them in determining to review under this standard assumes that the error
should have been obvious to the trial court. See, Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svkes. — P.3d — , f21,
2005 WL 3434444 (Utah App.) citing State v. Dean. 2004 UT 63, f 15, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 13, 10 P.3d 346 (to demonstrate plain error, a defendant must
establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant)). It is axiomatic that an error such as a change in law at the appeal
stage could not have been "obvious to the trial court," however, indicating the purpose for the
1

Appellant was not provided a copy of the jury instructions by either Benge or the trial court
prior to those instructions being read to the jury.

"exceptional circumstances55 standard as applied in Utah and argued in Appellants5 opening
brief.
The federal courts, however, have expanded upon Utah's concept of "exceptional
circumstances" as it pertains to unsettled areas of law to include what it terms a "plain error5'
concept at the stage of appeal rather than at the trial level. The United States Supreme Court
explained in Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718
(1997), that "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at
the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id
The United States Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's
inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were
plainly supported by existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. United States
v. Retos. analyzed this issue and explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error
was plain at time of trial, but whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct
appeal. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport, Inc.,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies to jury
instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in reliance
on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we will not
apply the invited error doctrine." 127 F.3d 299 (3rf Or. 1997).
Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because, at the
time of trial, the reasonable doubt jury instruction upon which Appellant's counsel was relying
was a settled area of law. See, State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However, at the
stage of appeal, the law which the instruction had relied upon was abandoned as
unconstitutional. See, State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of the
substantial change in the law from the time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the change to
3

the reasonable doubt jury instruction should be reviewed under either Utah's "exceptional
circumstances" rubric or the expanded "plain error" doctrine at the appeal stage, as outlined in
Johnson, Retos, and West Indies, supra, and not the invited error doctrine.
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did not
know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in the Reyes' case at the time of
the trial in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true given that
two other cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45, and State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, were argued
simultaneously with Reves before the Utah Supreme Court.

Both Cruz and Weaver were

arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights by
not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions. Even
those parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what that outcome would be given
that the cases argued at the same time were taking opposing positions to Reyes2.
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent.

See, e.g.,

Hodges. Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally asked to have the word obviate included in the
reasonable doubt jury instructions because he was unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes
would be. It was not possible to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reyes
was pending. See e.g., Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, trial counsel's
failure to object at trial was inadvertent and should be reviewed under Johnson's "plain error"
standard at the appeal stage, or Utah's original "exceptional circumstances" rubric, as argued in
Appellant's opening brief.

2

The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reves in Cruz and Weaver's cases and determined that Cruz
and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper standard to the jury without the
now abandoned phrase at issue herein.
A

Although Appellant's counsel did not object to the jury instruction at trial, there were
exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would result.
Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "obviates all
reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based on a
degree of proof that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in criminal
matters. See Reves. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellant to be found
guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt" violated his due
process rights and therefore, created a situation of substantial injustice, allowing exceptional
circumstances to apply. As the Appellant's liberty is at stake and this issue is constitutional, the
appellate courts have previously determined that they are "...obliged to consider it even though it
was not raised in the trial court." State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This
unsettled interpretation of the law colored the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the
issue at trial and should not be considered under the invited error doctrine.
B.

Reves Did Not Require the State to Argue That it Need Only Refute Doubts
Sufficiently Defined by the Jury.

In State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an extensive analysis
of their determination to abandon the Robertson test requiring the State to "obviate all
reasonable doubt," as more particularly set forth in the Brief of Appellant. See9 Brief of
Appellant at pp. 27-28. During this analysis, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof
necessary to convict. . .[t]he "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the
doubt against the evidence. . .[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not,
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to
articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that the
State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to
acquit.

5

Reves at f27. This analysis indicates that a juror is legitimate in acquitting when they have a
doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient, but cannot specifically
articulate what that doubt may be. Reves at f28, citing Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of
Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003).
The phrase that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" improperly permits the
State to argue that "it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined," thereby
diminishing the State's burden. Reves at 1J12. It is farreaching to believe that, in the process of
trying to prove their case, a prosecutor would orally articulate to a jury that, if the juror feels
doubt but cannot articulate or define it, then the State maintains no burden to overcome it. It is
clear from the Utah Supreme Court's overall analysis of this issue that it did not intend for
prosecutors to have to take this step in order for defendants to be protected from the substantial
risk inherent in the phrase at issue herein. Reves at %25-30. To require such would be to negate
the Utah Supreme Court's position on the matter.
C.

Cruz Upheld Reyes

The State attempts to argue that, since the Utah Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction
which stated that the law requires the evidence to "dispel" all reasonable doubt in State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, and since "dispel" and "obviate" are synonyms, the instruction
containing such "passes constitutional muster." See, Brief ofAppellee at pp. 21-22. The State's
argument mistakenly attempts to overrule Reves with Cruz while that was not the intent of the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cruz.
The Utah Supreme Court heard arguments on the case of State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, on
the same date as they heard State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33. Although Reves was determined nearly
two months prior to Cruz, Cruz reiterates and upholds what the Utah Supreme Court held in

Reyes. Under Victor v. Nebraska,, the model relied upon in the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Reves and Cruz, the United States Supreme Court held that reasonable doubt jury instructions
are unconstitutional if they allow " 'a reasonable juror ... [to] interpret[ ] the instruction to allow
a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
Victor^ 11 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)(citations omitted). This holding
in Victor was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Cruz, as follows:
Reasonable doubt instructions are unconstitutional if they allow a reasonable
juror to interpret the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of
proof below that required by the Due Process Clause; conversely, so long as the
reasonable doubt instructions, taken as a whole, correctly convey the concept of
reasonable doubt to the jury, they pass constitutional muster.
Cruz at 121. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Reves, the ".. /obviate all reasonable doubt'
element of the Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt
based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt..." Reves at f 30.

In the Brief of

Appellee, the State mistakenly takes the language of Cruz out of context by focusing only on a
small part of the Cruz decision in an attempt to set the constitutional standard as whether the
reasonable doubt jury instructions as a whole correctly conveys the concept of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" to the jury. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 21. However, according to the
holdings in Reves and Cruz, the reasonable doubt jury instruction cannot be correctly conveyed
to the jury when there is a substantial risk that a juror could have found the defendant guilty on a
degree of proof below that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." The Utah Supreme Court was clear
that the phrase requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt" carries that substantial risk
with it
The State additionally attempts to argue that the Utah Supreme Court did not uphold
Reves when it decided Cruz by stating that the reasonable doubt jury instruction in Cruz
contained substantively the same language as the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt," and was

7

upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 21. The State, however,
misreads Cruz to their own advantage. The State fails to mention that Cruz only challenged his
instruction based on the standards articulated in Robertson, which were expressly abandoned by
the Utah Supreme Court in Reyes and could thus not be upheld for Cruz.

Without a

constitutional challenge to the phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt," the Utah Supreme Court was
without authority to determine whether this phrase would additionally carry the same substantial
risk as the phrase in Reyes. The State attempts to argue that Cruz somehow overturned the
holding in Reves respecting the "obviate all reasonable doubt" phrase, but it is clear from its
intentions that the Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes through its determination in Cruz.
H. THE TRIAL COURT WAS INCORRECT IN REFUSING TO
DISQUALIFY APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL
The State in its Brief of Appellee attempts to argue that the trial court was correct in
refusing to qualify the Appellant's trial counsel and that Appellant's claim fails because the
Appellant must show a conflict of interest violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See,
Briefof Appellee at pp. 22-23.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Sufficiently Inquiry Into Mr. Benge's Prior
Prosecution of Appellant.

The State in its Brief of Appellee attempts to argue that the trial court undertook the
proper colloquy, asking the necessary questions to determine if there was a potential conflict of
interest in Mr. Benge's prior prosecution of the Appellant. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 27.
This Court has long held as follows with respect to a criminal defendant's express
dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel:
"Upon indigent defendant's expression of dissatisfaction with court-appointed
counsel, even if trial court suspects that defendant's requests are disingenuous
and designed solely to manipulate judicial process and to delay trial, trial court
must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive effort to determine natures of
defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of facts necessary to determine

whether defendant's relationship with appointed attorney has deteriorated to point
that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such extent that defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for substitution."
State v.PursifelL 746 P.2d 270,273 (Utah App. 1987). Perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.
Id. citing United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185,187 (3rf Or. 1982).
In the instant matter the trial court only performed perfunctory questioning to determine
if there was a conflict in Benge's representation of Wareham. The trial court was under the
obligation "...to apprise itself of facts necessary to determine whether defendant's relationship
with appointed attorney ha[d] deteriorated to point that sound discretion requirefd] substitution
or even to such extent that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but
for substitution." Pursifell at 273. The court did not inquire as to what previous charges there
may have been, when they occurred or by whom they were prosecuted. Instead, the trial court
simply asked Benge whether or not he remembered anything about Wareham as it pertained to
previous charges, to which Benge replied to the trial court that he did not remember. Wareham
attempted to tell the trial court when the previous charges occurred but was only able to say
"Ninety..." before he was interrupted by the trial court, who then denied his request for new
counsel and told that he could either proceed with the counsel he had or represent himself9.
R178 at pp. 22-25. Wareham, recognizing his limited knowledge as to the law, found the option
of self-representation to be no option at all. It was then discovered after Wareham had been

3

It is important to note that, when Wareham was interrupted by the trial court, he was first
attempting to refer to an extradition case to Colorado in 1999 heard by Judge Anderson and
prosecuted by Benge and would have then provided the trial court with information concerning
the 2002 DUI listed herein, together with information on a separate assault charge Benge
prosecuted him on and other instances in which Wareham appeared before Anderson. However,
Judge Anderson's inappropriate silencing of Wareham at this point in the colloquy precluded
this information from being offered on the record in this matter.

9

convicted, just prior to sentencing, that his prior DUI had actually occurred in 2002 and was
prosecuted by Benge before the same judge sitting on this matter. R179 at p. 145.
B.

The Deficiency in the Trial Court's Inquiry was Not Harmless

In the Brief of Appellee, the State appears to recognize the deficiency of the trial court's
inquiry into Wareham's express dissatisfaction with Benge. However, the State attempts to
argue that any deficiency in the trial court's inquiry was harmless because the Appellant has not
shown that there was a conflict of interest requiring the substitution of counsel. See, Brief of
Appellee at pp. 29-32.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." This right guarantees all criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of
counsel, State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990), and "includes the right to counsel
free from conflicts of interest." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App.1990) (citing
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (U.S. 1984). State v.
Johnson. 823 P.2d 484,488 (Utah App. 1991).
In State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah App. 1997), this Court analyzed the
breakdown of attorney-client relationships. This Court stated as follows:
...our examination reveals that the cause of the breakdown—or who is to "blame"-in an attorney-client relationship significantly affects whether the breakdown
constitutionally requires the court to substitute a defendant's court-appointed
counsel. Under established law, an indigent defendant does not have a right under
either the United States or the Utah Constitution to reject court-appointed counsel
in order to force the court to appoint new counsel unless the defendant shows
"good cause." See [State vl Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d [120, 121 (Utah 1986)]. To
successfully show "good cause" for rejecting court-appointed counsel, a
defendant must meet a heavy burden. A defendant must do more than show that
he or she does not have a "meaningful relationship" with his or her attorney. See
id Moreover, "[t]he fact that a defendant does not get along with his [or her]
attorney does not, standing alone, establish a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel." Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608, 622 (Utah 1994) (plurality opinion),

cert, denied, 516 U.S. 828, 116 S.Ct 97, 133 L.Ed.2d 52 (1995). Instead, to
establish "good cause" for rejecting a court-appointed attorney, a defendant "must
also establish that the animosity [between the defendant and his or her attorney]
resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney-client relationship that the right to
the effective assistance of counsel was imperiled." Id; see also State v. PursifelL
746 P.2d 270,274, (Utah App. 1987) ("Substitution of counsel is mandatory when
the defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a
complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his or
her attorney.").
Scales at 382. The Utah Supreme Court has long held as follows, respecting conflicting interests
in the attorney-client relationship:
It is a well-settled general rule that an attorney cannot represent conflicting
interests. For more cogent reasons an attorney may not, by a contract of
employment with his client, place himself in a position where his own interests
are in conflict with those of his client. The relation of attorney and client is one of
trust and confidence requiring the attorney to use all the care, skill, and diligence
at his command to serve his client alone without any obligation to serve a master
whose interests may be adverse to those of his client, and without any temptation
to serve his own interests at the expense of the interests of his client.
Klein v. Matthews. 99 Utah 398, 106 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1940), quoting Gillette v. Newhouse
Realty Co.. 75 Utah 13, 22, 282 P. 776, 779 (Utah 1929). This Court recognizes that "...the
attorney-client relationship is based upon trust, and is a situation in which one less
knowledgeable must rely on another, who has special expertise, for advice and assistance."
Merklevv.Beaslin. 778 P.2d 16,19 (Utah App, 1989).
In the instant matter there was a significant breakdown in the attorney-client relationship
based upon Benge's conflicting interests with Wareham. As recognized in Klien and Merklev.
an attorney-client relationship requires trust and confidence. Wareham made it very clear to the
trial court in this matter that he "had a hard time trusting [Benge] in [his] defense," R178 at p.7.
Based upon this lack of trust, Wareham requested that he be allowed to retain his own counsel.
Id. Besides the apparent lack of trust based on Benge's prior prosecution of Wareham on a DUI
charge, and possibly others, Wareham also articulated to the trial court that he had attempted to
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contact Benge on several occasions, had written him letters, even made an appointment with him
and come to his office only to find his door locked4. R178 at p. 10. Not being able to make
contact with his attorney5 contributed greatly to the lack of trust or confidence in Benge,
particularly given the prior recent prosecution of him in 2002.
The record discloses that Wareham had been prosecuted previously by Benge for an
assault and a DUI charge, which was used to enhance the DUI charge Benge seemingly defended
him in as it pertains to this matter. Having been prosecuted twice previously by the attorney
who was now to represent his best interests at trial made it nearly impossible for Wareham to
develop any kind or trust or confidence in Benge's defense, particularly when coupled with the
fact that the trial court did not want to entertain a discussion on the matter and interrupted
Wareham as he was attempting to set forth his reasons, as argued supra. Wareham could not
develop trust or confidence in Benge because of the fact that Benge had previously prosecuted
him. It was impossible for the Appellant to have an attorney-client relationship in which to
develop trust and confidence with his attorney when he was being defended by someone who
had previously advocated a conviction against him6. It is axiomatic that anyone in Wareham's
position, having been prosecuted by Benge as recent at 2002, could not have had the trust or

4

Appellant maintains that he waited for 20 minutes outside Benge's locked office, but the lights
were off and he saw no movement inside.
5

Appellant only met with Benge for a total of approximately 30 minutes in preparation of the
trial in this matter.
6

Also weighing against his trust and confidence in Benge was the fact that Mr. Craig Halls, the
prosecutor, recommended that Benge be appointed to represent Wareham and informed the trial
court that he had already spoken to Benge about this matter before he was actually appointed to
represent Wareham. Wareham was aware that Halls and Benge were fellow prosecutors in the
Seventh Judicial District Court with Halls representing San Juan County and Benge representing
Grand County,
io

confidence in their attorney-on which one is rightfully allowed to rely for their special
expertise-to put together a solid defense in hopes of increasing the chance of acquittal.
C.

The Error Requires Reversal and Remand for an Evidentiary Hearing or a
New Trial.

It is clear from Wareham's articulated and express dissatisfaction that the trial court was
required to conduct the necessary colloquy into the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship
between Wareham and Benge. It is also clear that the trial court failed to do so, particularly
when it interrupted Wareham while answering a pertinent question, in its failure to inquire
further into Wareham's history, and in its failure to recognize the lack of trust and confidence
axiomatic in the history of a relationship such as that between Wareham and Benge. The record
is only adequate to a determination of this issue based on the trial court's inquiry after the trial
concluded. Unfortunately for Wareham, the trial court's inquiry was too late and could not
protect hisrightto befreefromBenge's questionable representation. After analysis of this issue,
should this Court find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to make a determination as
to whether the trial court properly inquired into Wareham's request for substitution of counsel,
Wareham requests that this issue be remanded so that the trial court may undertake the
appropriate inquiry.
D.

The Conflict Affected the Entire Representation.

In the Brief of Appellee the State erroneously attempts to use Wareham's interrupted
statement to show that his DUI conviction occurred more than ten (10) years ago and therefore,
could not be used to support a conflict before the trial court in his being represented by Benge.
See, Brief of Appellee at p. 33. However, at the end of the trial when the required colloquy
finally did occur, it was discovered that the prior DUI conviction was in 2002, clearly within the
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ten (10) year statutory period of time lending support to the actual conflict of interest with
Benge. R179atp. 149.
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mentions that ",..[t]he prior DUI prosecution would
create a potential conflict of interest only if it was related to the current proceedings." Id. at p.
27. In making this statement, the State concedes that if the prior DUI is related, or affects this
matter, then it supports Wareham's argument that a conflict existed between him and Benge. As
argued in Wareham's Brief of Appellant, it is clear that the prior DUI was used to enhance the
alleged DUI in the instant matter.
Prior to sentencing, the trial court articulated that Wareham was guilty of Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol with Two Previous Convictions, a third degree felony. R179 at p. 145.
Because his previous DUI in 2002 was used to enhance the alleged DUI in the instant matter to a
third degree felony, it created a conflict of interest for Benge. Wareham cannot be faulted for
being interrupted by the trial court, when the interruption effectively denied his Motion for new
counsel and prevented him from providing the trial court with further information relating to this
charge or any other complaints respecting court-appointed counsel.

Had Wareham been

allowed to proceed further, the trial court would have discovered the current alleged DUI charge
was indeed enhanced by the previous one prosecuted by Benge, culminating in the conflict of
interest. Absent the interruption, the error could have been corrected at the commencement of
the trial and Wareham's rights could have been protected.
ffl. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
TO LOCATE A THIRD CHARACTER WITNESS
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Wareham's motion for a continuance to locate a third character witness.
See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 34-38. When moving for a continuance, the moving party must

show that denial of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the continuance."
State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A trial court's decision to grant a
continuance is a matter of discretion, and [this Court] review[s] the decision for abuse of the
discretion.9' State v. Tavlor. 2005 UT 40,1 8, 116 P3d 360, citing Seel v. Van Per Veur. P.2d
924, 926 (Utah 1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court denies a continuance and
the resulting prejudice affects the substantial rights of the defendant, such that a "review of the
record persuades the court that without the error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant'" Id. citing State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)
(auotinz State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984)).
On the opening day of this trial, April 13, 2005, Benge moved for a continuance based
upon that fact that a crucial defense witness, Diana Hacker, was unable to be subpoenaed due to
relocation out-of-state. R178 at p. 5. It was explained to the trial court that Diana Hacker was a
long-term relation and character witness pertaining to Malaska, having lived next door to her and
Wareham for years7. Benge informed the trial court that the subpoena for Hacker had just
recently come back and he had received information that Hacker relocated out-of-state. The trial
court erroneously listed two other character witnesses who it believed could provide the material
evidence Hacker would have provided and determined not to continue the matter on that basis.
The Joneses, however, whom Judge Anderson had substituted for Hacker's perceived testimony

7

Wareham presented statements to Benge from other witnesses besides Diana Hacker that he
believed would be used at trial and were not. Had Wareham been aware that Benge did not
intend to use these statements, he would have insisted on those witnesses also being called on his
behalf. Should this appeal result in remand for a hearing on the issue, Wareham requests that the
issue not be limited to Hacker and that he be allowed to present evidence of the other witnesses.
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were only able to testify as to one instance of violence where Wareham allegedly assaulted
Malaska. Wareham proffered that Hacker would have been able to testify to an established
pattern of behavior by Malaska against Wareham over the years. R178 at p. 13. Hacker was not
just a character witness, but a credibility witness. This difference could have impacted the jury's
determination in this matter where this matter is a he said/she said type of case. Hence, denial of
a continuance prevented Wareham from obtaining material and admissible evidence.
Information was presented to the trial court that Hacker could be produced within a
reasonable time, since information on the fact that she had relocated out-of-state was provided to
Benge by Deputy Hines. R178 at p. 5. Absent a continuance, however, Benge was not allowed
to further investigate the matter to try and locate and produce Hacker as a witness on Wareham's
behalf.
Information was also provided that the defense had exercised due diligence in preparing
for the case before requesting the continuance on this basis. Benge informed the trial court that
he had issued a subpoena for Hacker about two (2) weeks prior to the trial date and that it had
just recently been returned as "failed to serve" based upon relocation. R178 at p. 5. Absent a
continuance, however, Wareham was not able to follow up on the failed attempt at serving
Hacker.
Wareham effectively showed at the onset of trial that denial of a continuance would
prevent him from obtaining material and admissible evidence in the form of Hacker's testimony,
that Hacker could be produced within a reasonable time, and that his trial counsel had exercised
due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting a continuance. State v. Horton. 848
P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial court erred in not granting the continuance in
order to allow Wareham to locate a crucial witness who had relocated out-of-state. Given her

testimony as to Malaska's credibility and character in a case where it is Malaska's word against
Wareham's, it is clear that a continuance could have yielded a more favorable result for the
Appellant. In the interest of seeking the truth in this matter, the trial coxirt should have protected
Wareham's rights, recognized the factors of Horton were met, and allowed the continuance if
only for a brief time to attempt to locate Hacker.
IV. APPELLANT'S MERGER CLAIM WAS
PRESERVED AND IS MERITORIOUS
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that Wareham's merger claim is
unpreserved or, in any event, that it fails on merits. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 38-41. This
Court has previously held that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue
brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional
circumstances exist." State v. Pinder. 2005 UT 15, |45, 114 P.3d 551, citing State v. NelsonWaggoner 2004 UT 29,116, 94 P.3d 186. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the following
test with respect to establishing the existence of plain error:
...the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error
that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) An
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the
verdict is undermined." See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989); State
v. BelL 770 P.2d 100,105-06 (Utah 1988) State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919-20
(Utah 1987); State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984); see also State v.
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35; cf UT. R. EVID. 103(d); UT. R. CRIM. P. 19(c). If any
one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established. Cf State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992); Verde. 770 P.2d at 123.
State v.Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993).
As shown by UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3):
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
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included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or(c) It is
specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that "...where the two crimes are 'such that the greater
cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,' then as a matter of law
they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot be
convicted or punished for both." State v. Smith. 2005 UT 57, f 7, 122 P.3d 615, citing State v.
HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)). In
Hill, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a conviction for a
second offense arising out of the same set of facts violates

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-1-402(3),

requiring a comparison of "the statutory elements of the two crimes [first] as a theoretical matter
and [second], where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." Id. at 97.
With respect to the instant matter, the pertinent statutory elements of "aggravated
kidnapping'9 are as follows:
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping;
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another:..
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-302. The statutory elements of "assault," as they pertain to the charges

in this matter are as follows:
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or

10

(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102. As argued in Wareham's Brief of Appellant, it is clear that the

assault charge is lesser-included offense of the aggravated kidnapping charges in that assault
requires a showing of "an attempt, threat or act, committed with unlawfid force or violence that
causes bodily injury to another," while the aggravated kidnapping charge requires those same
elements to be shown in the course of the actor committing an unlawful detention or kidnapping.
Compare

UTAH CODE ANN

§ 76-5-302 (1) with

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102(1). The first

prong of the Hill test is obviously met here.
As compared to the evidence submitted at trial in this matter, the second prong of the Hill
test is also met. HiU at 97. The evidence relied upon by the jury in their deliberations and
determinations of guilt on the assault and aggravated kidnapping charges surround Malaska's
testimony concerning what happened on the day at issue herein. The only evidence alleged and
submitted to the jury to show an "attempt, threat, or act committed with unlawful force or
violence" occurred at Malaska's residence and in the truck on the way to the gravel pit, which
exact "attempts, threats or acts" were also alleged in the course of committing the alleged
unlawful detainer or kidnapping. There were no separate acts occurring by which to charge
Wareham separately for assault and aggravated kidnapping. Thus, the second prong of the Hill
test is met and Wareham was entitled to a merger of the assault charge into the aggravated
kidnapping charge.
By not recognizing that these two charges should be merged the trial court committed
plain error, as argued in Wareham's Brief of Appellant*. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 39-42.

* Appellant was also convicted in this matter of DUI and Intoxication, which also meet the HiU
test in that they contain the same elements and were founded upon the same evidence occurring
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The trial court should have recognized that these two charges included the same elements and
should have merged them. By failing to merge these two charges together, Wareham was
unlawfully convicted of two separate charges containing the same elements, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

Constitutions.

§76-1-402(3) and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Utah and United States

UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND.

V.;

UTAH CONST. ART.

I § 12; see, State v.

McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234,1235 (Utah 1990).
V. THE PRESIDING JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANTS MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE ANDERSON
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that the presiding judge correctly
denied Wareham's motion to recuse Judge Anderson. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 41-45. The
State fails on each of its arguments on this issue, as particularly argued below.
A.

Judge Bryner Did Not Comply with Rule 29 Given the Specifics of this Case.

First, the State specifically argues that Judge Bryner, who reviewed the Disqualification
Motion, complied with

UT.

R.

CRIM

P. 29 as it pertains to procedure respecting motions to

disqualify or recuse a judge from a case. Id. at pp. 41-42. The State fails to recognize that Judge
Biyner, however, failed to address the issues in the Disqualification Motion that were raised in
Wareham's supplementation, one of which is at issue herein.
While Judge Bryner appears to have complied with Rule 29, it is clear that he responded
only to those issues raised under an Anders rationale by Wareham's then-trial counsel, William
Schultz. Under Anders v. State of Cal. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,1400, (U.S.Cal. 1967), the
United States Supreme Court held as follows:
...if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
in a single criminal episode; however, these were also not addressed by the trial court for
determination as to whether conviction of these charges would constitute Double Jeopardy. It is
obvious that the trial court failed to recognize any potential mergers of charges in this matter.
on

withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's
brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points
that he chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full examination of
all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it
may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal
requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so
requires.
Schultz provided his affidavit to Wareham, informing him that he was filing it under an Aiylers
rationale since he did not believe it was meritorious. Wareham then provided a supplementation
containing additional issues he thought should be raised. Both of these actions complied with
Anders9. The trial court did not find the motion to be "wholly frivolous" and addressed those
issues raised by Schultz; however, Judge Bryner failed to address any of Wareham's arguments,
including the one at issue herein respecting the trial court's dispensing of his pro se filings.
While Judge Bryner may have appeared to comply with Rule 29, since this matter was
particularly filed under an Anders rationale, he was required to address Wareham's specific
issues or find them to be "whollyfrivolous,"of which Judge Bryner did neither.
B.

Serio, Battle, and Rodriguez are Either Distinguishable or Supportive of
Wareham in Their Application to this Matter.

The State argues that Wareham was not entitled tofilepro se pleadings as a represented
party. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 43. The State relies upon Illinois, Pennsylvania and New
York state appellate covin's in its analysis of this matter. As clearly shown below, however,
these cases are either distinguishable or supportive of Wareham's position in this matter.
(1)

Serio was allowed to file his motion pro se.

The State's reliance upon People v. Serio is particularly interesting in that Serio was
allowed to file a pro se posttrial motion in his case since he believed his counsel had been
9

It is important to note that no objections were made to thefilingof this motion under the
Anders rationale.
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ineffective. 830 N.E.2d 749, 757 (111. App. Ct. 2005). The Serio court found that the trial court
had jurisdiction to consider the motion. Id
In the instant matter, a hearing was held only three (3) days after the filing of Wareham's
Pro Se Disqualification10 at which time the trial court was informed that a bar complaint had
been filed by Wareham against Schultz respecting his alleged ineffectiveness. Schultz indicated
that he was not aware whether he could continue to represent Wareham. R053-R054. Then,
when Schultz filed the Disqualification Motion under the Anders rationale, he was effectively
informing Wareham that he did not believe it was meritorious and Wareham was again left to
somewhat represent his own interests. The Serio court recognized ihatpro se motions need be
entertained when a breakdown in the relationship between the attorney and client is apparent.
(2)

Battle recognized that pro se motions filed bv a represented party should
be forwarded to counsel.

The State's reliance upon Commonwealth v. Battle also raises interesting issues in that
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that, when a represented party files pro se petitions, briefs
or motions, they are forwarded to that parties' counsel. 879 A.2d 266,268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
Counsel can then address the issues raised pro se by his client. In the instant matter, the trial
court dispensed of his filings and his counsel was never made aware of them. The only evidence
of counsel's awareness of these filings was with respect to the Pro Se Disqualification, to which
counsel followed appropriate procedure and addressed the issues in the Disqualification Motion
filed under an Anders rationale. The trial court erred again, however, in failing to address the
issues specifically contained in Wareham's supplementation to the Disqualification Motion.

10

Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are afforded the same meaning given them in
Wareham's Brief of Appellant.

(3)

Rodriguez required defense counsel to be made aware of the pro se filings
and the trial court tofindthem "frivolous."

The third case upon which the State relies for its argument, People v. Rodriguez, held as
follows:
The trial judge acted within his discretion in declining to entertain pro se speedy
trial motions by a defendant represented by counsel, where defense counsel was
aware of the motions before joining in his client's application to be relieved, and
the court acknowledged the motions, ascertained that counsel chose not to adopt
them and, in so doing, described them as "frivolous."
741 N.E.2d 882, 885 (N.Y. 2000). The Rodriguez court's determination on the pro se motion
was made only when defense counsel was aware, the trial court acknowledged the motion,
counsel chose not to adopt them, and the trial court described them as "frivolous." In the instant
matter, defense counsel was unaware of most of Wareham's filings since the trial court
dispensed of them, the trial court did not give them any acknowledgment, counsel did not have
the opportunity to adopt them without knowledge of them, and the trial court never described
their contents as "frivolous."

Rodriguez is clearly either distinguishable or supportive of

Wareham's argument that the trial court erred in failing to address his issue in the
supplementation to the Disqualification Motion.
C.

Judge Anderson Specifically Articulated in an Order That He Instructed His
Clerks to Retain Only Those Pro Se Filings From Wareham Which Bore a
Case Number.

The State argues in the Brief of Appellee that Wareham has not proven that Judge
Anderson actually undertook dispensing of Ids pro se pleadings and has thus not met the burden
of showing that he was prejudiced by such action. See, Brief ofAppellee at p. 43. In Wareham's
Brief of Appellant, however, Wareham points to two instances, evidenced by the record on
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appeal, that Wareham filed pro se motions which were not made part of the trial court record11.
See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 43-44. When coupled with Judge Anderson's Order on the
Disqualification Motion which states that Wareham had "showered the court with papers that
may or may not be treated as pleadings" and that "those that bear a case number have been
retained," it is clear that a violation of Wareham's rights has occurred. See, R054-R055.
The State alleges that, even if the trial court undertook dispensing of Wareham's pro se
filings, no prejudice or actual bias has been shown by this action. See, Brief of Appellee at pp.
43-45. Specifically, the State argues that "even if Judge Anderson had instructed his clerks in
violation of the rule, defendant fails to explain how that action evidences actual bias. There is no
evidence that Judge Anderson's instructions were directed only at defendant as opposed to all
defendants who seek to engage in hybrid representation." Id at p. 45. The State fails to make
mention of Judge Anderson's Order on the Disqualification Motion which specifically singles
out Wareham because he has "showered the court with papers that may or may not be treated as
pleadings." See, R054-R055. Judge Anderson does not indicate in the Order that it is the trial
court's standard practice to only retain pleadings filed with a case number, obviously because
this type of practice would be a direct violation of UT. R. CIV. P. 10, as argued in Wareham's
Brief of Appellant. Nor does Judge Anderson state that Wareham's counsel's filings will only be
retained if they have a case number. Judge Anderson specifically targeted Wareham's pro se
filings and instructed his clerks to retain only those of Wareham's pro se filings that bore a case
number. See, R054-R055 (emphasis added).

11

Wareham has attempted to file several pleadings other than those evidenced by the record, but
recognizes his inability to argue those in their absence from the record. Hence, his argument
pertains to those clearly evidenced in the record on appeal in this matter.

In violation of Rule 10, Judge Anderson clearly targeted Wareham and his pro se filings
by instructing his clerks to retain only those that bore a case number. By doing so, Judge
Anderson exhibited bias towards Wareham by failing to treat him equally to those appearing
before him. Thus, Wareham's supplementation to the Disqualification Motion should have been
entertained and granted by Judge Bryner. Wareham's case was prejudiced by the failure of Judge
Bryner to address this matter.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Brief of
Appellant filed previously in this matter, Wareham respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's Judgment and enter such further orders as it deems necessary.
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entertained and granted by Judge Bryner. Wareham's case was prejudiced by the failure of
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Brief of
Appellant filed previously in this matter, Wareham respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's Judgment and enter such further orders as it deems necessary.
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